Different approaches to determine the acceptance criteria for fatigue induced failure of structural systems and components are discussed and compared. The considered approaches take basis in either optimization (societal cost-benefit analysis) or are derived from past and actual practice or codes (revealed preferences). The system acceptance criteria are expressed in terms of the maximal acceptable annual probability of collapse due to fatigue failure. Acceptance criteria for the individual fatigue failure modes are then derived using a simplified system reliability model. The consequence of fatigue failure of the individual joints is related to the overall system by evaluating the change in system reliability given fatigue failure. This is facilitated by the use of a simple indicator, the Residual Influence Factor. The acceptance criteria is thus formulated as a function of the system redundancy and complexity. In addition, the effect of dependencies in the structure on the acceptance criteria are investigated.
INTRODUCTION
For an offshore operator responsible for the safe and efficient operation of an entire facility it is important that the overall facility specific requirements to the acceptable risk to personnel, environment and economy can be verified and documented to the relevant authorities. A prerequisite for this is that the risk arising from the different subsystems of the facility can be quantified. Design and inspection requirements are, however, generally given on a component or element level and consider different failure modes separately. They normally focus on the probability of failure and neglect the consequences of the individual failure on the system. To prove that the design and maintenance specifications for the individual components are in compliance with the overall facility risk acceptance criteria, it is necessary to relate the individual component risk to the entire facility or the sub-system. In the present paper fatigue failure modes in an offshore steel structure are considered and a simplified but consistent approach to derive risk acceptance criteria for the individual joints is presented. Previous efforts in this research area include work performed by Kirkemo [1] , Moan and Vardal [2] , Faber et al. [3] and Stahl et al. [4] , however, so far no practically applicable approaches have been identified addressing how to derive component specific risk acceptance criteria from an overall facility perspective.
The different approaches considered within the present paper are divided into three main directions: 1) derivation of acceptance criteria from expressed preferences, such as acceptable FAR (Fatal Accident Rate); 2) derivation of acceptance criteria based on revealed preferences (best practice); 3) derivation of acceptance criteria based on an optimization approach. The main focus is on the second part in view of a pragmatic and applicable methodology for deriving acceptance criteria. The consistent consideration of Straub OMAE -03 -1013 3 system complexity and redundancy in the assessment of the acceptance criteria is presented.
Definitions
The term collapse is in the following reserved for the event of failure of the overall structure. The term failure is reserved for the event of fatigue failure of welded joints. A crack in a joint can occur at different hot spots. Only the term hot spot will be used in the following. A failed hot spot signifies a failed joint, where it is assumed that a failed joint has no residual load carrying capacity.
Acceptance criteria are given in terms of maximum allowable annual probabilities of failure, in accordance with Rackwitz [5] .  chosen ratio of the risk related to fatigue introduced collapse to the collapse risk related to extreme environmental loads.
Part A -Direct Acceptance criteria
Some authorities and codes specify a maximum risk to different groups of people exposed (personnel, public), see e.g. Paté-Cornell [6] . One current format for such criteria is the allowable Fatal Accident Rate ( FAR ), Aven [7] and Vinnem [8] . 
Part B -Acceptance Criteria based on Revealed Preferences
Deriving acceptance criteria based on revealed preferences, it is assumed that the socioeconomic risk associated with current practice and codes is generally accepted by the society. Such inherent acceptance criteria is evaluated 1) by calculating the probability of failure for different limit state functions that comply with code requirements, using Structural Reliability Analysis (SRA).
2) taking basis in the overall collapse capacity (as given by the RSR ), assuming that the prevailing structural collapse mechanism is extreme environmental loading.
3) by Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA), determining the failure rate observed in practice. This approach is difficult to apply for fatigue failures in practice due to the lack of available reliable data.
The general shortcoming of the approach is that progress in society (e.g. the increase in life expectancy) is not accounted for. A general discussion of acceptance criteria based on revealed preferences and its implications can be found in Slovic [9] .
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Acceptance criteria derived directly from codes
As noted in Faber [10] , reliability indices from different sources and models should not be compared directly. Therefore, the acceptable probability of failure and the probability of failure as evaluated for a specific structure should be calculated based on the same assumptions, applying the same methodology. A simple but (in this way) consistent approach is presented in the following, based on Faber et al. [10] and Moan and Vardal [2] .
The design criteria given in the NORSOK standard [11] for welded joints that cannot be inspected is a Fatigue Design Factor ( FDF ) a larger than 10 when the consequences of fatigue failure are large and 3  FDF when the consequences are minor. From these criteria it can be concluded that the probability of failure in the last year of service for a hot spot with FDF = 10 corresponds to the acceptable annual probability of collapse due to fatigue failure. Collapse is implied here in consistency with the assumed high consequences of fatigue failure. It should, however, be noted that a large majority of the joints in service 1) have FDF 's larger than the minimum requirement of the codes;
2) are not in their last year of service, therefore having a smaller annual probability of failure;
3) are part of a redundant system, where collapse is not equivalent to first member failure.
a The FDF is defined as the ratio of the calculated design fatigue life to the service life of the structure [3] .
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These factors lead to a "hidden" safety inherent in present structures. Focusing on the minimum required reliability without accounting for this additional safety may thus lead to an increase in the failure rate compared to present practice. The non-consideration of system redundancy on the other hand leads to inconsistency in the criteria, which, however, is common to all actual structural codes. The advantage of the method is that the same modelling can be applied to derive the acceptance criteria and to prove compliance of existing structures and maintenance policies with these criteria. Due to its simplicity and consistency (regarding the reliability model) this approach is by now the most commonly applied. An additional advantage is that the approach allows to derive a serviceability criterion (the minimum fatigue reliability required by the code, eg.
in NORSOK). For serviceability criteria, the non-consideration of the system effects has no implication. Fig. 1 illustrates the application of the NORSOK criteria: 
Acceptance criteria derived from the Reserve Strength Ratio (RSR)
If the fatigue performance of a structure is considered separately from the other failure modes, and if collapse due to fatigue failure is not considered as the main collapse mode, then acceptance criteria for fatigue failure can be derived from the acceptable risk of collapse due to the predominant structural collapse mechanism. For fixed jacket structures this will generally be an extreme weather event. The annual probability of collapse due to wave loads can be estimated as a function of the RSR , as described in Annex A. In accordance with Fig. A1 it can e.g. be said that a structure with RSR = 2 corresponds to a 
Indicators for the system characteristics
Given the acceptable annual probability of collapse, acc p , the acceptance criteria for the individual hot spots are derived in the following. The allocation of the risk to the different hot spots must thereby be based on the following factors:
1) Redundancy (of the structural system)
2) Complexity (the number of fatigue critical hot spots)
3) Dependency (between the different failure and collapse modes)
Effectively, the acceptance criteria for each hot spot are based on indicators for these three system characteristics as presented in the following.
Modeling the structural system
System strength is represented by the annual probability of collapse, The simplification allows for modeling the system as a series system, illustrated in Fig.   3 for a structure with two fatigue critical hot spots. For a structure with N critical hot spots the system is accordingly, consisting of N 2 elements.
Figure 3. System reliability model (with 2 fatigue critical hot spots).
With the introduction of conditional events of collapse the model presented in Fig. 3 is modified to Fig. 4 . Therein the event of any (i.e. one or more) fatigue failure is denoted by F . The total probability of collapse is evaluated from the probabilities of the individual events as shown in Fig. 4 . For this system with 2 fatigue critical hot spots the probability is calculated as in Eq. (2). It is the probability of failure of a series system with mutually exclusive events.
Eq. (2) is simplified further by the following approximations, which are justified by the generally large fatigue reliability of welded joints in offshore structures:
, the annual probability of collapse given fatigue failure of hot spot i , may be estimated as a direct function of the Residual Influence Factor ( RIF ). This important step is shown in Annex B. Thereby the RIF is a main indicator for the redundancy the structure.
Because collapse not related to fatigue failures is treated elsewhere, only the probability of collapse combined with fatigue failure, 
In that case the probability of collapse due to a fatigue failure is rewritten as
In order to relate the overall fatigue acceptance criteria 
b Dependency between fatigue performance at different hot spots is investigated in the next section. c In the example in part C this simple requirement will be replaced by the optimal allocation of the risk reducing measures. 
Accounting for the effect of dependencies
The above presented derivation of the acceptance criteria for individual fatigue subjected hot spots does not account for all dependencies. The elements shown in Fig. 4 are in general not independent. In the previous modeling it has been taken into account that the conditional collapse events (  COL ) are mutually exclusive. Moreover it is assumed that the collapse events are independent from the fatigue failure events, and that the fatigue failure events themselves are independent of each other. These dependencies will be treated in the following.
Fatigue failures at different locations are generally dependent. Straub and Faber [14] present a methodology for the consideration of this dependency in inspection planning.
Whereas the dependency has positive effects on the information obtained from inspections, it has adverse effects on the system probability of collapse and must thus be accounted for. In Eq. (2) the term of higher order was omitted, reasoning that (due to the assumption of independence) the probability of coincidence of two or more fatigue failures is low. The number of fatigue failures given independence is in fact binomial distributed. This binomial distribution is in the following compared to the distribution of the number of fatigue failures given a dependency between the individual fatigue failures. The (illustrative) model from Straub and Faber [14] is used. The model assumes a 100% correlation between the stress ranges in the fatigue sensitive hot spots. The omission of the higher order terms in Eq. (2) can now be investigated: The probability of collapse including one fatigue failure is compared to the probability of collapse including more than one fatigue failure (which is the omitted part), Table 1 : 
Independent hot spots
Dependent hot spots Table 1 shows that for independent hot spots the probability of collapse originating from one fatigue failure is dominant, justifying the simplifications. For dependent hot spots this is not the case. It is seen that the probability of collapse due to more than one fatigue failure is dominant and therefore must not be omitted. Treatment of dependency would necessitate not only a model of the dependency but also knowledge of the collapse probability as a function of several fatigue failures (as shown in Fig. 7 ). This is Comparing Fig. 8 to Fig. 6 it is seen that the dependency in fatigue performance is less crucial if only failures occurring in one year are considered. If these are combined with the respective conditional probabilities of collapse from Fig. 7 then the equivalent to Table 2 shows that when only failures in the last year are considered, the omission of more than one fatigue failures is not crucial. Given that there are no failed hot spots present before the last year, what can be ensured by yearly inspections, Eq. (9) is a sufficiently accurate description of the acceptable risk in a structure. The appropriate inspection interval depends on the correlation assumed between fatigue performance at the individual hot spots (the lower the correlation, the less inspections are needed). In addition the probability of detection ( PoD ) of a failed hot spot has to be considered.
Part C -Optimization
Acceptable probabilities of failure of engineering systems and individual components of systems can be derived by means of optimization as outlined already by Rosenblueth and Mendoza [15] . More recent publications include Rackwitz [5] , Kübler and Faber [16] and Faber [17] . Following this approach the acceptable probabilities of failure for the system as well as for its components can be identified as those yielding a positive service life benefit B , given for illustrational purposes as
where I denotes the service life income of the facility, D C are the design costs, M C are the expected inspection and maintenance costs and F C are the expected failure cost, 
The variable  is in the following omitted for simplicity. From Eq. (11) it follows that the optimum is reached when 1  CORR . In case based on the Life Quality Index (LQI) concept from Nathwani et al. [19] , see also Skjong and Ronold [20] . If the ICAF is prescribed then the following condition must be fulfilled for all possible risk mitigation alternatives:
For the design or for the planning of inspection and maintenance activities for fatigue sensitive joints of a structural system, the optimal allocation of resources, i. 
Example
The example considers an in-service structure where the income I and the design costs variable. Applying the probabilistic model (fracture mechanics and inspections) and the cost model as in Straub and Faber [14] , the expected failure costs are calculated as a function of the maintenance effort. This is performed by use of the generic approach to risk based inspection planning as introduced in Faber et al. [3] and elaborated in Straub [12] .
Three different hot spots are considered, characterized by their FDF and RIF value. It is assumed that RIF = 0.8 corresponds to failure costs of 1. The cost of failure for RIF = 0.7 is then (applying the simplified system model and in accordance with Fig. B1 )
is the conditional probability of collapse given fatigue failure of a hot spot with RIF = 0.8. The resulting functions are illustrated in Fig. 9 . Each point along the graphs corresponds to a reliability level. The curves in Fig. 9 do not represent continuous functions because the effect of maintenance (inspection plans) is only calculated for specific maximal annual probabilities of failure, Straub [12] .
Straub OMAE -03 -1013 23 Figure 9 . Expected failure cost as a function of the maintenance effort.
Because at the optimal solution the CORR value is equal for all hot spots, the acceptable risks should be allocated so that all CORR are the same and such that the total acceptable system failure probability is not exceeded. Fig. 10 shows the annual probability of collapse due to fatigue failure, (14) This is equivalent to the acceptance criteria derived in Eq. (2-9) but instead of demanding equal risk contribution now equal CORR is demanded. This is the most optimal solution (with regard to the maintenance costs) that still fulfills the total acceptance criteria. Given a total accepted 
Discussion & Conclusions
Different approaches to the derivation of risk acceptance criteria for fatigue sensitive details are discussed. It is shown that based on two indicators, RSR and RIF , consistent acceptance criteria can be derived. The approach is based on the fact that the RSR implies an accepted risk of structural collapse due to extreme events, to which the acceptable fatigue induced collapse risk is related. The RIF is a simple but consistent indicator for the system redundancy, whose relation to the acceptance criteria is shown Straub OMAE -03 -1013 25 in the paper (Eq. (9) & Annex B). In this way all the system characteristics (redundancy, complexity, dependency) are included in the formulation. The importance of regular inspections for failed joints is outlined; they ensure that fatigue failures of the individual joints may be regarded as independent. This assurance of independency may also be a valid concept for highly redundant structures (such as ship hulls), where the RIF concept is not appropriate (because in these cases it is generally very close to one). In addition it is shown how the maintenance costs can be accounted for when allocating the risk to the individual joints. In this case the uniform distribution of the risk to the individual hot spots is replaced by the optimal allocation.
A highly practical way of deriving acceptance criteria is to combine the approach based on RSR and RIF , as illustrated in Fig. 5 , with the serviceability criteria ( Fig. 1 ) which is obtained directly from the code requirements. This can be directly implemented in practice.
